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Unions, Job Security, and Incentives of
Workers
Abstract
  We consider why  blue collar workers are more likely to organize unions than white
collar workers by looking at commitment devices and imperfect signals on workers'
actions. Under contractual incompleteness, firms cannot  ex ante promise to keep
employment levels high. However, if unions resist firms' dismissal policies by the request
of high severance pay, unions can play a significant role as a commitment device for job
security. Then, since firms can decrease wage and increase employment level, the profit
of unionized firms can be more than that of non-union firms. Furthermore, we show that
imperfect signals on workers' actions weakens the role of unions as a commitment device.
This results in less union organizing by white collar workers since the efforts level of
white collar workers is more difficult to observe than that of blue collar workers.
JEL Classification Numbers: J51, J412
1. Introduction
Union membership rates in private sectors have been decreasing in many
developed countries. One cause is the transition of the industrial structure. The share of
the service industry in the employee population has been rapidly increasing for about four
decades and has exceeded that of the manufacturing industry. With this change, white
collar employees increase. On the other hand, unions are less likely to be organized,
participated in, and managed by white collar employees compared to blue collar workers.
Blanchflower and Freeman (1992) point out the difference of union membership rates
between manual workers and non-manual workers in major developed countries: 30%-
13% (U.S.), 53%-42% (U.K.), 44%-27% (Germany), and 56%-45% (Australia), where
the former is the membership rate of manual workers and the latter is that of non-manual
workers. Farber (1983), Edward et al. (1992), Jacobi, Keller, and Müller-Jentsch (1992),
Hotz-Hart (1992), and Visser (1992) point out similar results. Our purpose here is to
consider the reason why the union membership rate of white collar workers is lower than
that of blue collar workers by focusing on the union's role as a commitment device and
imperfect signals on workers' actions.
Recent studies consider commitment devices under incompleteness of contracts:
the effect of issuing bonds for raising capital (Agihon and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994)); delegation of authority (Cremer (1995), Agihon and Tirole (1997),
and Itoh and Hayashida (1997)); decentralization or centralization economy (Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995) and Qian and Xu (1998)); and, privatization of public firms (Schmidt
(1996)). This paper provides a new view of unions as commitment devices.
A simple labor contract specifying basic wage level is considered. Usually,
payment is explicitly described in labor contracts, i.e., wage offers are verifiable. Unless
it is verifiable, many workers may not get paid if a firm is unwilling to pay the wage, and
the firm is not punished in court because of unverifiability. Hence, as labor laws state,
basic wage should be described explicitly in labor contracts. However, workers still face
uncertainty in job security under the free dismissal principle supported by labor laws. A
firm can dismiss employees under some restrictions determined by labor laws. Actually,
labor laws prohibit workers and firms from making long-term contracts beyond one year
in the U.S. and Japan. Furthermore, dismissal rates of employees contingent on the states
cannot be described or determined ex ante in labor contracts due to bounded rationality or
huge transaction costs. Under contractual incompleteness, a firm cannot ex ante promise to
keep employment high nor promise not to maximize its ex post profit. In other words,
opportunism cannot be constrained: a firm always maximizes the  ex post profit.3
Employees then take this into account when making contracts with a firm. When workers
are required to make efforts at increasing the possibility of good states for a firm, the firm
must compensate the cost of workers' efforts by paying a wage higher than that in the spot
labor market. Since the firm optimizes its employment level ex post and does not maintain
excess employment after observing the realized state, workers have no incentives for
making contracts with the firm and putting forth efforts unless a sufficiently high wage is
offered.
If the union's resistance activities to the firm yield sufficient severance pay as
dismissal compensation to dismissed employees, then a low basic wage can cover
workers' efforts cost, and a unionized firm will have a lower payment and higher job
security than a non-union firm. Therefore, the unionized firm can use the union as a
commitment device for job security, and increase the ex ante expected profit, although the
firm loses ex post free controllability of employment level. As Eguchi (2000a) shows,
under incompleteness of contracts, unions might be welcomed by firms because unions act
as commitment devices.
Furthermore, we extend the model to the case of imperfect signals on workers'
actions. Under the existence of imperfect signals, the above result can be modified, that is,
high job security, which the union helps ensure, may discourage workers from making
efforts. Uncertainty of employment enhances workers' incentives under contractual
incompleteness. If workers were never dismissed as the result of making explicit and
verifiable contracts, they would have no incentives for making efforts since  shirking
workers would not be punished by firm managers. Hence, if the signal is sufficiently
imperfect, workers' motivations can be weakened by the existence of unions. We will
provide a simple example and show that the imperfection of the signal lowers the value of
unions as commitment devices. Firms are then unwilling to allow unions, and thus are
likely to attack unions' activities and discourage employees from managing and
participating in unions. Indeed, as Freeman and Rebick (1989) and Farber (1990) show,
the acceptance of firm managers is very crucial to organizing unions. When firm managers
are opposed to employees' organizing and managing unions, employees very often fail to
organize and manage unions.
The above argument may explain why blue collar workers more often organize,
manage, and participate in unions than  white collar workers. Outputs of blue collar
workers are more observable than those of white collar workers, and the outputs of white
collar workers, except in the case of car and insurance sales, are not likely to be directly
linked to a firm's output. For example, consider jobs of white collar workers in personnel
departments, general affairs departments, public information sections, and accounting4
sections. It is difficult for firm managers to distinguish whether employees have delivered
efforts. Therefore, the signal is less perfect and precise at the workshop of white collar
workers than of blue collar workers. Our model implies that firms are less willing to
have white collar employees organize and manage unions.
This paper is organized in the following manner. In chapter 2 we present the
model and compare profits and job security in firms with unions to those without unions.
We will show that unions play a significant role as a commitment device, and, as such,
the expected profit of firms with unions can be more than that of firms without unions.
Chapter 3 focuses on the imperfect signal case. In this case, firms are unwilling to allow
unions since their presence is likely to break the incentive scheme. In chapter 4, we
discuss the characteristic differences and union membership rates between blue and white
collar workers. Finally, our conclusions are set forth in chapter 5.
2. Basic Model
When a firm intends to dismiss workers, dismissed workers can get sufficient
severance pay as dismissal compensation by the resistance activities of a union. As we
mention later, after wage has been decided, both a union and a firm observe the state. In a
recession, the firm attempts to dismiss some employees to maximize its profit and sweep
out an excess of workers. On the other hand, the union can get severance pay as the firm's
dismissal cost by its various activities, for example, strike activities, lockouts,
accusations of 'unfair' dismissal in the mass media, demonstrations and sit-ins. Without a
union, workers cannot sufficiently obtain severance pay on being dismissed by a firm due
to no bargaining power.
Timing of decisions by a firm and a union is as follows. See figure 1.
蝀 First, the firm has a skilled labor pool normalized to 1 and offers wage w to the skilled
workers. The firm cannot make contracts contingent on the state with any worker and
the union. This basic wage offer is verifiable.
蝁 Workers are required to make efforts for increasing the possibility of good states for
the firm. Efforts level is discrete:  e e e ={ , }. The efforts cost function is expressed by
C e C e c ( ) , ( ) = = 0 , where c is a constant. If a worker shirks, he is always discovered
and dismissed by the firm at no cost.
1
蝂 After workers' decision on making efforts, the firm can choose to continue the
                                                
1 Workers' incentive problem is analyzed later.5
industrial relation or not. If the firm deviates the industrial relation, the firm gets zero
profit certainly and workers receive no payment since the production process in the
firm has not stated at all. On the other hand, if the firm keeps employment, the firm and
workers proceed to next step.
蝃 All workers pay for routine management costs of the union K.
蝄 Then, Nature chooses a state, and the firm and the union know the realized state
q q ˛( , ] 0 .
蝅 The union chooses a resistance strategy and the firm determines the employment level.
Their strategies are the best response to each other on the equilibrium.
蝆 Dismissed workers receive dismissal compensation R. On the other hand, employees
retained in the firm get the wage specifying in the original contract.
Workers' skills are firm specific and essential to producing outputs, and thus the
firm cannot employ any worker from the outside labor market ex post. The firm can use
labor inputs normalized to 1 at most.
The union determines the per capita severance pay  R  which is paid to a
dismissed worker. If the firm dismisses (1-L) workers, the total severance pay as firing
costs is R(1-L), where L is the actual employment level of the firm. The firm's profit  p q ( ),
given  菆, is expressed as follows:
p q q ( ) ( ) ( ) . . = - - - £ f L wL R L s t L 1 1
It is assumed that the production function  f(L) satisfies the following condition:
f f f ' , " , ( ) > < = 0 0 0 0 and  lim '( )
L f L
ﬁ = +¥
0 . This assumption implies that, if  R=0, a
positive employment level L, which yields a positive profit to the firm, always exists
under any state  q q ˛( , ] 0 .
Throughout this paper, the group working of the skilled workers is absolutely
necessary. If cooperation of the employees is not realized, the firm's state will not be
enhanced. If a worker shirks, the firm is likely to incur a bad state. Thus, the firm's
expected profit will be less than zero:
E e E e ( ( )| ) ( ( )| ) p q p q < < 0 .                                      ...(1)
The left hand implies the expected profit when some workers shirk, and the right hand is
that when all workers make efforts. Hence, when the firm discovers shirking workers, the
firm is willing to choose not to continue the industrial relation and zero profit is realized.
It is assumed that, in the unionized firm, all workers belong to the union.
Although workers sufficiently exercise their bargaining power to get severance pay if a6
union is organized, it is costly for workers to manage the union and obtain the dismissal
compensation. The activity cost of a worker is expressed by  C
R
K U = +
2
2
, K is a fixed
cost of union management. The fixed cost  K implies a union membership fee and is




 is the variable cost
of the union activity to obtain the severance pay R. The more severance pay workers will
get, the more rapidly the activity cost increases. The expenditure of C U by workers is
socially wasteful.
Union case
We consider the stage after the state is revealed from a view of backward
induction consideration. At this stage, a basic wage is given. First, consider the firm's
best response to the union's resistance strategy. Given R, an optimal employment strategy




U = - FH IK R S T
U V W
- min , ( ' ) , 1
1
q
                                  ...(2)
where LU or wU is employment level or wage with the union, respectively. This equation is
the first order condition. When the union's resistance level is large, the firm attempts to
employ more workers.
Next, consider the union's optimal resistance strategy. The expected utility of
workers with the union, in which the fixed cost as a union membership fee and effort costs
have been sunk, is  w L R L
R
U U U + - - ( ) 1
2
2
. Given the firm's positive employment strategy
LU, an optimal strategy which maximizes the expected utility of workers is represented by
R LU = - 1 .                                                   ...(3)
A unique Nash equilibrium is introduced from (2) and (3). In figure 2, the Nash
equilibrium is expressed by  A L L U U : ( , )
* * 1- , where  LU
*  satisfies
qf L w L U U U ' ( ) ( )
* * - + - = 1 0.                                     ...(4)
Clearly,  LU
*  is a function of  q q : ( )
* LU .
Lemma 1



















= - < 0.
The severer a recession is, the stronger the resistance of the union is.7
Denote the critical point of the firm's state in which full employment is realized








. Under  q q q
** £ £ , it holds that  LU =1. In summary,
the following severance pay  R  and employment levels  LU are realized as  a Nash
equilibrium:
R L and L L if
R and L if
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Next consider workers' ex ante expected utility and the firm's expected profit. A
worker's expected utility with the union is represented by





d w K c








- R S T
U V W
+ - - -
z
z
( ) ( ( )) ( )
( )
( ( ))





q q f q q
q
q












      ...(6)
where  f q ( ) or  F( ) q  is the density or distribution function of the state when all workers
have delivered efforts. Thus, individual rationality of workers under perfect information
on workers' efforts is  UU ‡ 0,                               ...(7)
where the reservation utility is normalized to 0. The unionized firm's expected profit is
PU U
U U U U
U
d
f L w L L d
f w d
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It is clear that the firm's profit is a decreasing function with  wU. Thereby, individual
rationality (7) is always binding. Hence, wU is determined with  UU = 0.
Non-Union case
   If a union is not organized, workers without bargaining power cannot resist the firm's
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1
q
,                                      ...(8)
where L F and wF are employment level and wage in the non-union case. In this case, if







,  LF( ) q =1. Under  q q <
*,  L L f
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= ” FH IK
-1 . The expected
utility of workers is as follows:8
U w L d w c F F F F = + - - z
* * ( ) ( ) ( ( ))
*




where UF is denoted as a worker's expected utility without unions. Individual rationality
is  U F ‡0.                                                         ...(9)
The firm's profit is as follows,








1          ...(10)
Since the firm's profit decreases with wF, (9) is always binding.
Here, consider a fixed cost level of the unions activities. We assume the fixed
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Equation (11) implies that net effect of the union to the expected utility of a worker is zero.
If the net effect is negative: K>K0, workers are unwilling to organize the union. On the
other hand, if it is positive: K<K0, a proposition mentioned later will be strengthened.
Under (11), the expected utility of a worker with the union is replaced by
U L w d c
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Under (11), the following lemma holds.
Lemma 2
   It holds under (11) that
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Lemma 2 indicates that full employment is more likely with unions than without
unions. Lemma 2 [2] and [3] are reasonable since unions raise severance pay as firing
cost. These results are consistent with empirical studies: Freedman and Medoff (1984),
Muramatsu (1983) (1984), Brunello (1992), Blanchflower and Freeman (1992), Tomita9
(1993), and Koike (1991). These studies find that union effects decrease employees' quit
rate. However, you may think that this is inconsistent with payment in the real world since
it indicates that the wage at firms with unions is less than at firms without unions.
Intuitively, it seems that the unions' bargaining power raises wage. However, opinions
are divided on unions' effect on increasing wage. As Freeman (1994) and Tachibanaki
(1998) indicate, the union-nonunion wage gap in the U.S. is exceptionally large, whereas,
in other developed countries, the union effect of increasing wage is small or negative.
Indeed, there are studies which reject this union effect of increasing wage;  Brunello
(1992), Valleta (1993), Tsuru and Rebitzer (1993), Tachibanaki and Noda (1993), and
Kishi (1995). The result of lemma 2 [1] is introduced from the policy of the union which
attaches much weight to workers' job security. As a cause of the union's policy attaching
much weight to job security, we point out the entry deterrence policy of unionized firms.
The threat of entry by rival firms prevents unions from raising wage. If rival firms intend
to enter the market, the unions may accept a lower wage in order to deter entry. As
Ishiguro and  Shirai (1998) show, entry deterrence policy forces unions to pay more
attention to job security rather than to obtaining high wages.
Next, compare profit of a non-union firm to that of a unionized firm. First,
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*. Hence, under
0 < < q q
*,  p F is a convex function with respect to  q. Under  q q q




F f const = = > ( ) . 1 0. Clearly,  pF ( ) 0 0 = . Therefore, profit of a non-
union firm is represented in figure 3.




















U U U f L L L = + - > ( ) ( ) ' ( ) 1 0. Obviously,  p q U ( ) is linear under
q q q
** £ £ .
2 Furthermore, it holds that  L and U U ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 1 = = - p .
3
When the state of the firm is severe, profit of the non-union firm is more than that
of the unionized firm. On the other hand, in booms, the unionized firm gets more profit by
                                                
2 Under  0 < < q q
**,  p q U( ) is not necessarily a convex function with respect to  q .
3 This result is introduced as follows. Suppose that  w R L U U £ = - 1  on the equilibrium. In this case,
full employment is optimal for any state. Hence,  wU £ 0. This contradicts individual rationality (7),
and thus it holds that  w R L U U > = - 1  on the equilibrium. The firm's optimal employment level
under  q= 0 is  LU( ) 0 0 = . Hence, it holds that R=1 and  pU ( ) 0 1 = - .10
w w U F < . In figure 3, the case wherein the curve  pU  and the curve  pF cross at a unique
point  $ q is represented. From figure 3, the existence of unions might increase expected
profit. For example, consider a case of high workers' efforts cost in which individual
rationality under the non-union case is not satisfied, but individual rationality under the
union case is satisfied. This case, as figure A-1 suggests, can occur. Under the non-union
case,  PF = 0 because contracts are not enforceable, while under the union case,
PU > 0. Under contractual incompleteness, contracts are not enforceable without unions
because the firm optimizes the employment level ex post. However, the existence of
unions makes contracts enforceable, and the union exercising power on job security
enhances the firm's profit.




d K c = - L
NM O
QP - - z q q fq q
q
( ( )) ( )
2
0 2
.                           ...(12)
Hence, the first best allocation is expressed by
"q ˛ = = ( , ] ( ) 0 1 0 q q L and R .
Union members have higher job security than non-members. The effect of unions on job
security improves social welfare. On the other hand, The cost of union activities
decreases social welfare. Therefore, if the former positive effect exceeds the latter
negative one, firms' profits increase by the existence of unions.
Proposition
   There are cases wherein the expected profit of the unionized firm exceeds that of the
non-union firm if workers' efforts cost c is sufficiently high:  P P U F > .
  
Firms lose the free controllability of employment level ex post, and thus the union
decreases the firm's profit ex post under  q q ˛( , ] 0 . However, unions play a significant
role in job security of employees. Since unions raise employment stability, firms can
lower basic wage ex ante, and unions would then be welcomed by firms.
4
                                                
4 If unions focus on increasing basic wage in the original contract, they try to obtain a wage level that
will maximize the expected utility. However, firms in this case do not wish for unions since the
increase of basic wage decreases firms' profits, and firm managers are willing to discourage workers
from organizing and managing unions.11
3. Imperfect Signal and Incentives
We have considered the case of perfect information on employees' actions: a
firm can distinguish whether a worker is shirking or not. Unless this is so, the previous
results might be modified.
Suppose that a firm cannot observe workers' efforts level but can observe an
imperfect unverifiable signal on their efforts level. Denote density or distribution function
of states in the case wherein all workers have delivered high efforts level  e  as  f q ( ) or
F( ) q . Density or distribution function of states in the case wherein some workers have
shirked and provided low efforts level is  f q ( )  or  F( ) q . Density function  F( ) q  is the
first order stochastic dominant to  F( ) q .
If all workers have made efforts, the firm receives a good signal  s s =  with
possibility q  ( . ) 05 1 < < q  or a bad one  s s =  with possibility 1-q at no cost. Otherwise,
even if only one worker shirks, the firm observes a bad signal  s s =  with possibility q or
a good one  s s =  with possibility 1-q. Signal  s  (s ) implies imperfectly that all workers
have made efforts (or not). The firm receives signals on the workers' efforts level after
workers have chosen their actions, and then the firm decides whether to continue or not. If
the firm ceases the industrial relation, zero profit is realized. On the other hand, if the
employment relation proceeds, Nature chooses a state observable by workers and the
firm. See figure 4 on timing of decisions by workers and the firm. The signal may
influence on the firm's choice on whether to continue or not.
Signal Case
First, we consider the case wherein the firm decides whether to continue by
operating based on the signal: the firm chooses to continue if the firm receives the good
signal  s , otherwise the firm deviates from the individual relationship. In this case, the
group of workers chooses the mixed strategy on the level of efforts on equilibria. Note
that the firm's signal based determinant is not the best response if the group of workers
chooses the pure strategy. If workers are willing to make efforts with probability 1, the
firm has an incentive to continue regardless of the signal, whereas, if they always shirks,
the firm is willing to cease.
Denote the probability that the group of workers makes efforts  e e =  as m. In
this paper, it is assumed that all workers choose an identical action by proper
communication. When the firm receives the good signal  s , using  Bayse's rule, the
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 (See figure 5). The expected profit conditional signal  s is
expressed by
P j j j m s p e s E e p e s E e j U or F ( , ) ( | ) ( ( )| ) ( | ) ( ( )| ) ” + = p q p q .
Furthermore, when the firm's signal based operation is optimal, it is necessary to hold the
following condition in either case with or without a union:
P P j j m s m s j U or F ( , ) ( , ) < < = 0                           ...(13)
Here, define the levels of the probability  m m j j ,  as follows:
P P J j J j m s and m s j U or F ( , ) ( , ) = = = 0 0 .
Condition (13) is replaced by
m m m j U or F j j > > =                                    ...(13)'
When (13)' does not hold, the firm will not use the signal based operation.
5 If the firm
faces a bad signal under (13)', the firm will have no incentive to continue the industrial
relationship, and then zero profit is realized and workers get nothing.
The less precise the signal, the less likely it is that workers will make efforts.
When the signal is very imperfect employees are likely to shirk since firms face the
difficulty of recognizing employees' efforts level, and firms would not use the signal
based operation. We consider this case later.
When the signal is not imperfect very much the firm will use the signal based
operation. If the firm receives the good signal  s , the firm continues employing workers.
Otherwise, the firm is unwilling to continue. In this case, workers' individual rationality
with the union is as follows:
U m q w L R L
R
K d c
m q w L R L
R
K d
U U U U
U U U
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Using (3) and (11), individual rationality (14) is replaced by
                                                
5 It always holds that  m m j U or F j j > = ( ). By the definition,
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p p p p m rm r
.
By q>0.5 and (1), it is obtained that  m m j j > .13
U m q w L d c m q w L d U U U U U = - L
NM O
QP + - - L
NM O
QP ‡ z z ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q f q q q f q q
q q
0 0 1 1 0 ..(14)'
Since workers choose the mixed strategy, it holds that
q w L d c q w L d U U U U ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q f q q q f q q
q q
0 0 1 0 z z - = - > .
This implies that workers are indifferent to making efforts. Clearly, individual rationality
(14) is not binding. If the above equation does not hold, workers are always willing to
make efforts or always have an incentive for shirking. Then, the signal based operation is
not optimal for the firm. The above equation is replaced by
I w w L q q d c U U U U ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ” - - = z q fq fq q
q
1
0 n s .                   ...(15)
In the same manner, individual rationality without the union is considered,
U m q w L d c m q w L d F F F F F = - L
NM O
QP+ - - L
NM O
QP ‡ z z ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q f q q q f q q
q q
0 0 1 1 0.
Under the mixed strategy, it holds that
I w w L q q d c F F F F ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ” - - = z q fq fq q
q
1
0 n s .                   ...(16)
If (13)' is satisfied, the firm is to determine by the signal whether to continue or
not, and workers randomize their efforts level at the probability m. This forces a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
You may think  I w I w U F ( ) ( ) >  in a manner similar to the perfect information
case. However, note that the sign of  q q f q f q ( ) ( ) ( ) - - 1 n s is ambiguous. The distribution
function of the state contingent on efforts level, and the production function influence the
levels of IU(w) and IF(w). Thus, the sign of  I w I w U F ( ) ( ) -  is ambiguous. Therefore, it is
not always obtained that  w w U F < : the wage difference between the union case and the
non-union case depends upon the distribution function and the production function. This
result is contrary to that seen under perfect information on workers' efforts, where it
always holds that  w w U F < . Note that  w w U F <  is a necessary condition whereby unions
are welcomed by firms if the same mixed strategy  m is chosen. The firm loses free
controllability of employment level by existence of the union. Hence, if the firm's profit is
enhanced by the union, it is necessary to hold  w w U F < .
6 We can show that profit of the
unionized firm is less than that of the non-union firm for any state if  w w U F > . Clearly, the
following inequalities hold:
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The last inequality is obtained from the viewpoint that LF is the optimal employment level
of the firm given wF. Therefore, information asymmetry weakens the role of the union as a
commitment device.
No signal case
The firm might not use the signal based operation. In this case, the firm offers a












































.                   ...(17)
Using (11), (17) is replaced as follows:
~ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) I w w L d c U U U U ” - ‡ z q fq fq q
q n s
0 .                        ...(17)'
In the same manner, incentive compatibility without a union is
~ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) I w w L d c F F F F ” - ‡ z q fq fq q
q n s
0 .                         ...(18)
Obviously, comparing (17)' and (18) with (15) and (16), a similar result can be obtained:
it does not always hold  w w U F < .
An example
We can show a simple example of  w w U F >  under the imperfect signal case.
Two states, a boom and a recession, exist:  q q > > 0. If all workers make efforts, the
probability of a boom or a recession is 0.5, otherwise, a recession always occurs. From a
viewpoint of backward induction consideration, consider the determinant of employment
level given wage level after the state is observed. Throughout this example, it is assumed
that a boom is good enough to occur full employment, and that a recession is sufficiently
severe to be unwilling to maintain full employment regardless of the unionized firm. In the
union case, this assumption implies that the following inequalities hold on the
equilibrium:
q q f w and f w U U ' ( ) , ' ( ) 1 0 1 0 - > - < .
In a manner similar to the previous section, employment level is realized as follows:
L and L L U U U ( ) ( )
* q q = = 115
where it is satisfied that  qf L w L U U U ' ( ) ( )











Individual rationality under the mixed strategy is represented by
U m
q
w L c m q w L U U U U U ” + - L
NM O
QP+ - - ‡
2
1 1 1 0 ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
where the reservation wage is zero in the same manner as in the previous chapter. We
assume that there are some proper probability levels  m ˛( , ) 0 1  wherein the signal based
operation is the best response for the firm. Thus, it holds 
q
w L c q w L U U U U 2
1 1 ( ) ( )
* * + - = - ,
and hence it is obtained that
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1 .                              ...(19)
Next, consider the non-union case. The following inequalities hold on  the
equilibrium:
q q f w and f w F F '( ) , '( ) 1 0 1 0 - > - < .
Thus, it holds that
L and L L F F F ( ) ( ) ( )
* q q = = < 1 1                                 ...(20)
where  L f
w
F





. Without unions, it holds in the same manner that
I w w
q q
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1 .                              ...(21)
If  q ‡
2
3
, the left hands of (19) and (21) are positive. If  q <
2
3
, the left hands of (19) and
(21) decrease with LU and LF, and thus the minimum 2q-1 is realized under LU=1 or LF=1.
Using q>0.5, it is obvious that the left hands of (19) or (21) are positive. Therefore, the
left hands of each are always positive for any  q ˛( . , ) 05 1 .
Here, in the same manner as the proof of lemma 2, suppose that wU and wF are
equal. Under wU=wF=w, the existence of unions leads to high job security in a recession:
L L U F
* * > . Hence, if  q >
2
3
, it holds for any wage level that
I w I w for any w U F ( ) ( ) ( ) > > 0 .                             ...(22)




However, i f  q <
2
3
, the following inequality (23) holds instead of (22) by
L L U F
* * > :16
I w I w for any w U F ( ) ( ) ( ) < > 0 .                             ...(23)
In this case, (23) leads to  w w F U < . (See figure 6.) Therefore, the existence of unions
always decreases the ex ante expected profit of the firm.
When the imperfect signal is precise enough,  w w U F <  holds. On the other hand,
when the signal is not precise enough, it holds that  w w F U < . Under the imprecise signal,
the possibility of dismissal gives an incentive to employees. The threat of dismissal in
recessions encourages workers to provide the necessary level of efforts. However, the
existence of  unions which resist to obtain severance pay in recessions will discourage
workers from making efforts. Hence, higher wage induces workers to make efforts since
unions give employees high job security. Without unions, workers have less job security,
and thus they have incentives for making efforts while they get lower wage. This is
similar to the result of the efficiency wage model (Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)). In the
efficiency model, the threat of dismissal is brought from partial monitoring. If a worker
shirks and are unluckily caught by firm managers, he is dismissed and receives no
payment as the result of the punishment of his shirking activity. However, if a shirking
worker is not monitored fortunately, he is not dismissed. Monitoring is very crucial. In
our model, the threat of dismissal exists for workers under even no monitoring. Under
contractual incompleteness, the firm cannot promise to keep job security high in
recessions. The possibility of dismissal in recessions is encouraged workers to make
efforts; workers are willing to increase the probability of booms by their efforts. High job
security and high payment under the union case decrease the profits of firms. Therefore,
firms are unlikely to wish for the existence of unions under the imperfect signal case.
7
4. Discussion: Blue Collar and White Collar
                                                
7 A similar result is easily obtained when the signal based operation is not used. In the no signal case,
incentive compatibility is represented under (3) and (11) as follows:
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Thus, incentive compatibility is replaced by
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In a similar manner, it is obtained by  L L U F
* * >  under  w w w U F = =  that
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Thus,  w w U F > .17
In the early twentieth century when the service industry was not so large, the
share of  white collar employees in the workforce was low, and thereby white collar
employees stood at a middle position between firm managers and blue collar workers. As
Mills (1951) pointed out, while they were hired as employees by firm managers, they
were likely to behave as agents of managers to blue collar employees. White collar
employees had a kind of dignity and could exercise power over blue collar employees
like managers. Hence,  white collar workers rarely belonged to unions organized and
managed by blue collar workers. However, as the transition of the industrial structure
occurs and the service industry grows, clerical and service workers have increased and
their dominant position over  blue collar workers has disappeared. Under these
environmental changes, unions have been willing to involve white collar workers. Thus,
it appears that unions have involved  white collar workers, and yet their union
membership rate has been lower compared to that of blue collar workers. Farber (1983)
points out that clerical and service workers who desire union representation are
significantly less likely to be hired by unionized firms than blue collar workers who
desire union representation.
We have considered the role of unions as a commitment device. It has been
shown that unions are more likely to play a significant role as a commitment device under
perfect information on workers' actions than under imperfect signals. We will now
attempt to extend this result into the idea that unions are more often organized and
managed by blue collar workers than by white collar workers.
Indeed, it is more difficult to measure outputs and skills of white collar workers
than blue collar workers since jobs of white collar workers are not always directly
linked to outputs. This includes jobs in personnel departments, general affairs
departments, public information sections, and accounting sections. Koike (1997) points
out that white collar workers are required to accumulate skills at the workshop. Aoki and
Okuno (1996) define white collar employees' skills as contextual skills which are shaped
in workers' partnerships and are effective only through human relationships in the
workshops. The measurement cost of white collar workers' skills will be higher than the
cost of blue collar workers. Indeed, there are studies which support the above statement
on the measurement cost of white collar workers' skills. According to Lazear's shirking
hypothesis on wage profiles (Lazear (1979) (1981)), the difficulty of monitoring workers
leads to delayed compensation schemes which gives workers incentives. Actually, the
wage profiles of white collar workers are more upward-sloping than those of blue collar
workers in Japan and the U.S. (Shimada (1981)). Eguchi (2000b) shows that the difficulty18
of measuring workers' actions leads to more upward-sloping wage profile and high job
security which are the characteristics of white collar workers. Therefore, the signal on
workers' actions is less likely to be precise and correct at the workshops of white collar
workers compared to those of blue collar workers.
Less perfect signals on workers'  actions lowers the role of unions as a
commitment device, and thus firms are unlikely to wish for unions. As Freeman and
Rebick (1989) and Farber (1990) find, allowance of firm managers is very crucial to
setting up unions in the real world. Therefore, it can be explained why unions are more
often organized and managed by blue collar workers than by white collar workers by the
fact that firm managers can observe blue collar workers' efforts level better than that of
white collar workers.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a new role of unions focusing on unions' power.
Under contractual incompleteness, firms cannot promise high job security to its workers
in recessions. Firms always optimize employment level  ex post. However, if unions
exercise their power to obtain high severance pay, firms can promise to keep employment
level high as a result of unions' role as a commitment device. Thus, firms can decrease
basic wage and provide high job security, and firms' profits increase.
Furthermore, we extend the model to the case of imperfect signals on employees'
actions and show that signal imperfection weakens the role of unions as a commitment
device. Uncertainty on job security, that is, the possibility of dismissal, encourages
workers to make efforts. Hence, since unions keep job security high, a moral hazard
problem is likely to occur. Existence of unions weakens the workers' incentives, and thus
unions are likely to decline firms' profits. This explains the observed fact that unions are
more likely to be organized and managed by  blue collar workers than by white collar
workers. Jobs of white collar workers are rarely linked to outputs of the firm directly, for
example, jobs in public information sections or accounting sections. Therefore, firm
managers cannot often distinguish whether white collar workers have made appropriate
efforts, and thus do not wish for the existence of unions under signal imperfection and
will hinder unions' members and prevent unions' activities. Actually, firm managers'
affirmative attitude to organizing unions is very crucial in the real world. Hence, white
collar workers are more likely to be discouraged from organizing, managing, and
participating in unions than blue collar workers.19
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Proof of lemma 2
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with the union is higher than that without the union, and thereby it holds that
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Hence, if UU(w) and UF(w) are continuous, and contracts with the unionized firm are





‡ 0 at the minimum solution wU of  U w U U ( ) = 0, and
when  U w F U ( ) < 0 (See figure A-1). Since the firm maximizes its profit, it chooses the
minimum wage that satisfies individual rationality. Thus, it is obtained that  w w U F < .
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Timing
   
         Making contracts: w is determined.
         Workers' making efforts or not
         Firm's receiving signal: s
         Firm's choice of continuation
         State  菆is revealed.
         The union determines resistance strategy R.
         The firm chooses the optimal employment level L.
         Dismissed workers get severance pay R .
         Production
         w is paid to retained employees.
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Note that U U and UF are not always expressed in this manner. However, if w is
sufficiently low, the expected utility of workers who have made efforts is negative even if
high employment stability is realized. On the other hand, very high wage lowers job
security, so that workers' expected utility is negative.